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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of information provided to drivers through advance warning flashers (AWFs) 
on driver’s probability of conflict at the onset of yellow at a high-speed intersection. AWFs are specifically 
designed to minimize the number of vehicles trapped in their respective dilemma zones at the onset of 
yellow. A probit modeling technique was used to establish dilemma zone boundaries. Based on the dilemma 
zone boundaries probability of a perceived conflict curves was computed and compared against actual 
conflicts observed at each of the studied intersections. The comparison between the actual and theoretical 
probability of conflict curves generated a better understanding of the risk associated with providing drivers 
with information prior to the onset of yellow through the use of advance warning flashers (AWFs). Results 
found that providing drivers with information in advance of the intersection using AWFs can potentially 
cause increased risk in RLRs and/or severe decelerations. Thus, caution should be used by engineers before 
providing drivers with information at a high speed intersection. 
 
Keywords – dilemma zone, driver’s decision models, traffic conflict technique, advance flashers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the total cost of motor 
vehicle collisions in the United States was estimated at $230.6 billion in 2006 [1]. The total cost 
of motor vehicle collisions in the State of Nebraska was projected at $2.4 billion in 2007 [2]. 
Intersection and intersection-related crashes accounted for nearly 40.5 percent of all reported 
crashes in 2006 in the U.S [1]. Intersection crashes average approximately 8,500 fatal and 
900,000 injury accidents a year.  
This paper reports on an empirical study modelling the impacts of advance warning flashers 
on driver decision making at the onset of yellow at five high speed intersections. At high speed 
intersections, drivers travel at high speeds with the expectation of proceeding through without 
stopping. A driver approaching the intersection has to decide whether to stop or go at the onset of 
yellow. An incorrect decision to stop when it would have been safer to proceed can lead to a 
severe rear-end collision. Conversely, an incorrect decision to proceed through the intersection 
could lead to the driver running the red light and possibly causing a right angle collision. The 
zone where the risk of making an erroneous decision is highest is termed the “dilemma zone” [3]. 
The dilemma zone has been defined as the approach area where the probability of stopping on the 
onset of yellow is within the range of 10 to 90 percent [4]-[6].   
       Copyright 2011, University of Roma. Used by permission.
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In order to help drivers make more informed decisions at the onset of yellow, engineering 
countermeasures enhancing the signal display by providing advance information to motorists have 
been implemented. Placed upstream of high speed signalized intersections, advance warning 
flashers provide drivers with information regarding whether they should prepare to stop at the 
upcoming traffic signal or proceed through the intersection. Specifically, AWFs are designed to 
minimize the number of vehicles trapped in their respective dilemma zones at the onset of yellow 
[7]. Data was collected and compared at five high speed intersections: 4 in Lincoln, NE and 1 in 
Noblesville, IN. Data collected at the onset of yellow included: distance to stop line, speed, and 
decision of driver to stop or proceed through the intersection. The impact of AWFs on probability 
of stopping and probability severe conflicts was assessed by developing binary discrete choice 
models.  
The paper finally presents the dilemma zone boundaries and risk of severe conflict associated 
with each intersection. The intent of this paper is to document the shift in dilemma zone 
boundaries due to the effect or lack of information received by the driver from AWFs, and 
illustrates the increase in severe conflicts as a result of poorly timed yellow change intervals. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Defining dilemma zone 
At high speed intersections, drivers travel at high speeds with the expectation of proceeding 
through without stopping. A driver approaching the intersection has to decide whether to stop or 
go at the onset of yellow phase. An incorrect decision to stop when it would have been safer to 
proceed can lead to a severe rear-end collision. Conversely, an incorrect decision to proceed 
through the intersection could lead to the driver running the red light and possibly causing a right 
angle collision. The zone where the risk of making an erroneous decision is highest is termed the 
“dilemma zone” [3]. The dilemma zone was initially defined as the area where the driver can 
neither stop comfortably nor clear safely at the onset of yellow [8]. The dilemma zone locations 
were determined deterministically using perception reaction time, comfortable deceleration rate, 
and length of the yellow interval. However, studies have shown a wide variability in driver 
behavior at the onset of yellow [9]-[13]. 
To take into account the variability in driver behavior, researchers defined a second type of 
dilemma zone. Also referred to as the decision dilemma zone, Type II dilemma zone, is based on 
a probabilistic approach of drivers’ decision to the onset of yellow. The decision dilemma zone 
has been defined as the approach area where the probability of stopping on the onset of yellow is 
within the range of 10 to 90 percent [3-6]. Researchers have attempted several approaches to 
characterizing the decision dilemma zone boundaries. Zeeger [6] used a frequency-based 
approach of drivers stopping decisions at specified distances and speeds to develop a cumulative 
distribution function.  
Recently, researchers have used binary discrete choice models to develop probability of 
stopping curves and better understand the underlying human decision models [14]-[19]. 
 
2.2. Effects of yellow length on driver behavior 
The effects of yellow interval duration on stopping have also been studied. Lengthy yellow 
intervals were found to cause bad driver behavior for last-to-stop drivers at intersections [20]. 
Instead of being presented with a red indication as they approached the stop line, the drivers were 
stopping while the light was still yellow. Thus, persuading the driver to proceed through the 
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intersection the next time they approached the intersection. Van der Horst and Wilmink [20] 
found drivers adjusting their stopping behavior as a function of longer change intervals. The 
probability of stopping for drivers 4 seconds from the intersection decreased from 0.5 for a yellow 
length of 3 seconds to 0.34 for a yellow length of 5 seconds long. Mahalel and Prashker  [21] 
noted a potential increase in the indecision zone for a lengthy “end-of-phase” warning interval. 
They observed an increase in the indecision zone from the normal zone of (2 to 5 seconds) 
without a flashing green interval to an indecision zone of 2 to 8 seconds for a 3-s yellow that was 
preceded by a 3-s flashing green. Mahalel and Prashker [21] presented evidence of increases in 
the frequency of rear-end crashes due to the increase in the indecision zone. In a study of multiple 
intersections in Texas, Bonnenson et al. [22] noted that drivers do adapt to an increase in yellow 
duration. Reductions in red light running (RLR) were found to decrease up to 50 percent for 
increases in yellow ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 s, as long as the yellow duration did not exceed 5.5 
seconds. Contrary to the previous results, Olson and Rothery [23] concluded that driver behavior 
does not change as a function of different yellow phase durations. Studies have also shown that an 
overly long amber could lead to greater variability in driver’s decision making and potentially 
increase rear-end conflicts [5, 20, 21]. 
 
2.3. Effects of Advance Warning Flashers 
Placed upstream of high speed signalized intersections, AWFs provide drivers with 
information regarding whether they should prepare to stop at the upcoming traffic signal or 
proceed through the intersection. Specifically, AWFs are designed to minimize the number of 
vehicles trapped in their respective dilemma zones at the onset of yellow [7]. AWFs have been 
found to improve dilemma zone protection in the state of Nebraska. McCoy and Pesti [24] used 
advanced detection along with AWFs to develop an enhanced dilemma zone protection system. 
The system was found to reduce the number of max-outs, which would result in a loss of dilemma 
zone protection. Additionally, the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) developed an Advanced 
Warning for End-of-Green System (AWEGS) that utilized a sign (text or symbolic), two amber 
flashers, and a pair of advanced inductive loops [7]. The system capable of identifying different 
classifications of vehicles (car, truck) has shown to decrease delay due to stoppages at traffic 
signals, as well as providing extra dilemma zone protection to high-speed vehicles and trucks. 
Results of the study have shown a reduction in Red Light Running (RLR) by 38 to 42 percent in 
the first 5 seconds of red.  
Gibby et al. [25] concluded from an analysis on high-speed signalized intersections in 
California that advance warning flashers significantly reduce accident rates. The approaches with 
AWFs had lower total, left-turn, right-angle, and rear-end accident rates. Sayed et al. [26] 
calculated the reduction in total and severe accidents at intersections with AWFs to be 10 and 12 
percent, respectively. Farraher et al. [27] observed red light running and vehicles speeds in 
Bloomington, Minnesota. Installation of advanced warning flashers resulted in reductions of 29 
percent in red light running, 63 percent reduction in truck red light running, and an 18.2 percent 
reduction in the speed of the red light running trucks. 
Although the consensus of AWFs is that the systems provide safety benefits to the users, 
several concerns have been raised. In their study, Farraher et al. [27], detected car drivers running 
the red light entered speeds above the speed light increasing the risk of crash for opposing traffic. 
Pant and Huang [28] evaluated several high-speed intersections with AWFs and detected 
increases in speed as the traffic signal approached the red phase. Thus, the authors discouraged 
the use of Prepare to Stop When Flashing (PTSWF) and Flashing Symbolic Signal Ahead (FSSA) 
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signs along tangent intersection approaches. Further testing performed by Pant and Xie [29] at 
two intersections verified the previous findings of increased speeds along roadways with a 
PTSWF or FSSA sign. Koll et al. [30] compared the effects of flashing green on 10 approaches in 
Austria, Switzerland, and Germany. Safety impacts considered included the amount of yellow and 
red stop line crossings observed. A substantial increase in the number of early stops was found in 
Austria. A larger option zone, area where drivers can both proceed and stop safely, increased as a 
result. Although longer and larger option zones can lead to increases in rear end collisions, Koll et 
al. concluded that early stops should reduce the probability of right-angle collisions. 
 
2.4. Traffic conflict 
Traditional surrogate measures of safety (like number of vehicles in dilemma zone) fail to 
quantify the risk of crash for a driver approaching an intersection. The Traffic Conflict Technique 
(TCT) has evolved and demonstrated its usefulness in indirectly evaluating the safety of 
intersections, as researchers have established direct relationships between conflicts and crashes 
[31]-[33]. Perkins and Harris defined a conflict as “The occurrence of evasive actions, such as 
braking or weaving, which are forced on the driver by an impending crash situation or a traffic 
violation.”  This paper was particularly interested in the conflict types occurring at the onset of 
yellow. Thus, the onset of yellow conflicts identified by Zeeger [6] was used: red light runner, 
abrupt stop, swerve-to-avoid collision, vehicle skidding, acceleration through yellow, and brakes 
applied before passing through. 
 
3. Background 
3.1. Nebraska sites 
Data was collected from five high-speed signalized intersections in Lincoln, NE. Individual 
intersection characteristics for all sites studied are shown below in Table 1. Each intersection was 
instrumented with three wide area detectors (WAD) recording individual vehicle information. 
Two SmartSensor Advance WADs, utilizing digital wave radar technology, installed on the 
research pole track the vehicles upstream and downstream of the pole and record their distance, 
speed, lane, and vehicle length up to a distance of 500 ft. A SmartSensor HD acts as the 
midstream sensor and records the vehicles information equidistant with the research pole. In 
addition to recording speed, the SmartSensor HD identifies the lane a vehicle travels in and 
records vehicle length. The stated accuracy of a WAD used for data collection is within 5ft. A 
detailed analysis on the performance of a WAD can be found in previous works [15]. Data was 
collected starting July 2010 to December 2010 from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM. The data was collected 
for a total of 19 days during the collection period. Only clear weather days were used for 
calculating the dilemma zone boundaries. Additionally, only instances when a single vehicle was 
present in a lane were used for determination of dilemma zone boundaries. 
 
3.2. Noblesville sites 
In contrast to the previously studied sites, the Site 6 did not provide drivers with information 
prior to the intersection. Therefore, data collected by Sharma et al. [15] at SR 37 was used for 
evaluation purposes. The site had a single WAD, as well as a single camera mounted on the signal 
mast arm. Sharma et al. [15] provides further information on how data was collected and 
processed. 
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Tab. 1 - Site characteristics 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Underlying theory of driver’s decision 
Driver behavior at the onset of yellow is essentially a binary choice process, where the driver 
chooses from two possible courses of action: stop or go [14]. Let Tp be the time perceived by a 
randomly chosen driver from the population required to cross the stop bar. As a result of the 
variance in driver behavior based on several independent factors such as, perception of the 
distance from the stop bar, perception reaction time, perception of the yellow interval based on 
past experience etc., Tp can be modeled as a normally distributed random variable, as shown 
below in Equation 1. 
ξ+= reqp TT                                                                                                                             (1)                        
where Treq is the required time to safely enter the intersection based on the vehicle’s onset 
distance and speed and ξ is a random variable is assumed to be normally distributed. 
Similar analyses have been performed using perceived and required time to stop bar and 
perceived and required acceleration [14, 15]. If the perceived yellow time, Tp, is greater than the 
required time necessary to pass through the intersection, drivers will decide to stop, otherwise 
they decide to go. The probability of stopping curves can then be modelled as probit function. 
Figure 2 presents a probability of stopping curve for given speed. Again for a given speed, two 
critical thresholds can be calculated for a driver approaching the intersection at the onset of 
yellow: distance requiring severe deceleration by the driver if they decide to stop and the distance 
at which a driver would accelerate heavily or run the red light if they decide to proceed. The 
following calculations were performed as examples of the acceleration and deceleration threshold 
based off of 85th percentile acceleration and deceleration values from Sharma [15]. The distance 
for which a vehicle cannot proceed through the intersection without heavily accelerating or RLR 
is calculated as shown below: 
( )2
2
1tan PRTyellowayellowspeedceDis Accel −+⋅=                                                            (2) 
where speed is the speed of the vehicle at the onset of yellow (ft/s), yellow is the length of 
yellow (s), a is the 85th percentile acceleration, 3.19 ft/s2 [15] and PRT is the perception reaction 
time of 1 s. 
For a speed of 80.667 ft/s (55 mph) and a yellow length of 4.9s, the critical acceleration 
distance equals 420 ft. This distance will be referred to as the maximum passing distance 
throughout the remainder of this thesis and represent the critical acceleration threshold.  
 Saltillo Highway 2 Pioneers US 34 US 75 SR 37 
Site Code Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Yellow phase 4.4 s 5.6 s 4.9 s 4.4 s 4.5 s 5.0 s 
Mean speed 54.1 48.5 52.8 56.6 51.4 46.6 
Posted speed limit 55 mph 55 mph 55 mph 60 mph 55 mph 55 mph 
85th Percentile speed 64 55 58.3 63 61 55 
Use of AWF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
AWF Distance 650 ft. 563 ft. 650 ft. 650 ft. 470 ft - 
AWF Time before yellow 7.0 s 8.0 s 8.0 s 7.0 s 6.0 s - 
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Fig. 1 - Critical distances along probability of stopping curve 
 
A vehicle at the onset of yellow upstream of this fixed distance choosing to proceed through 
the intersection will require heavy acceleration or will run the red light. Similarly, a fixed distance 
can be calculated where a vehicle will be require to decelerate heavily, as shown in Equation 3. 
PRTspeed
d
SpeedceDis decel ⋅+⋅= 2tan
2
                                                         (3) 
where d is the 85th percentile deceleration, 14.41 ft/s2 [15]. Again using 80.667 ft/s (55 mph) 
and a 4.9s yellow interval, the severe deceleration distance is computed to be 306 ft.  A vehicle 
downstream of this distance choosing to stop will be required to decelerate heavily to stop prior to 
the stop bar. The two critical threshold distances previously calculated are shown in Figure 1. 
 
4.2. Traffic conflicts 
Drivers choosing to stop downstream of the severe deceleration distance and choosing to 
proceed upstream of the maximum passing distance have made an erroneous decision. The 
consequences of a driver making an erroneous decision at the onset of yellow can lead to a 
conflict and in the previously mentioned cases a severe conflict. The probability of perceived 
conflict can be calculated using the critical thresholds and stopping probabilities as shown in 
Equation 4. 
⎩⎨
⎧
>∀−=
<∀=
treqSTOPGo
treqSTOP
CONFLICT DDPP
DDP
P
1
                                           (4) 
where Dreq is the required distance to perform chosen decision, and Dt is the critical distance 
threshold depended on yellow time. Perceived conflicts can be classified into minor and severe 
based on the magnitude of the acceleration or deceleration required to perform the chosen 
decision and the typical ranges of acceleration or deceleration used by drivers. The required 
acceleration or deceleration to complete the chosen action therefore can be used to determine the 
severity of the evasive action needed. If the required acceleration or deceleration is within the 
typical operating ranges, a minor traffic conflict would occur; but if the required acceleration or 
deceleration is greater than the thresholds of the typical ranges, a severe traffic conflict would 
occur. Drivers in the zone of a minor conflict are likely to have minor traffic conflicts such as an 
abrupt stop, applying the brakes before proceeding, or acceleration through yellow. However, the 
drivers in the zone of severe conflict will have severe traffic conflicts such as running a red light, 
swerving to avoid  a collision, or vehicle skidding. For this paper, only severe conflicts were 
calculated. 
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a. Reduced variance b. Shift in threshold 
Fig. 2 - Effect of information provided to drivers 
 
4.3. Effect of information 
Providing drivers with information through AWFs has shown to alter the probability of 
stopping curves [30]. There can be two potential impacts of providing information to drivers a.) 
the probability of stopping curves becomes steeper due to reduction in perception error as shown 
in Figure 2a. Note that threshold value is not affected and both the curves have the same mid-
point. b.) the threshold value (perceived duration of yellow) changes thus shifting the probability 
of stopping curve as shown in Figure 2b. The probability of stopping curve could be shifted closer 
or further away from the intersection. Recalling that probability of conflict is dependent upon 
probability of stopping and the two critical thresholds are fixed results in a shift in the probability 
of conflict curve. If the probability of stopping curve were shift closer to the stop bar the 
probability of severe deceleration would increase. Conversely, a shift in the probability of 
stopping curve further away from the intersection could result in an increase in RLRs. 
 
5. Data analysis and results  
5.1. Best fit model parameters 
At the onset of yellow, a driver can choose from two mutually exclusive courses of action: 
stop or go. The decision process thus can be modeled by binary discrete choice models. Based on 
the approach followed by [15], a probit model was used to investigate the influential independent 
variables for driver decision at each intersection. The independent variables tested were a. Time to 
stop bar, b. Distance to stop bar, c. Speed at onset of yellow, d. Deceleration required to stop the 
vehicle within the stop bar, e. Acceleration required by the vehicle to cross the stop bar prior to 
onset of red. An extensive analysis was performed, on the five variables listed previously to 
determine the set of instrumental variables that affect a driver’s choice. Maximum likelihood 
estimation technique was used to obtain estimates of the parameters using NLOGIT. Models were 
compared using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). AIC takes into account both the statistical 
goodness of fit and the number of parameters required to obtain that goodness of fit. As the 
number of model parameters increase, a penalty is imposed on the model. The best or preferred 
model is the model that has the lowest AIC value. Results of the analysis showed the best 
performing model was time to stop bar and a constant, as shown in Table 2. 
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Tab. 2 - Probit model results 
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Fig. 3 - Critical distances along probability of stopping curve 
 
5.2. Dilemma zone boundaries and effect on stopping 
The final estimated parameters were used to develop probability of stopping curves for a 
speed of 55 mph at each site, as shown below in Figure 3. The probability of stopping curves 
reveals the effect of information provided to the drivers from the AWFs. The three Nebraska 
Department of Roads sites (Site 1, Site 3, and Site 4) and Site 6 are relatively close, with Site 1 
and Site 4 having essentially identically curves. As shown previously in Table 1, Site 1 and Site 4 
operate the same with the flashers starting 7 seconds before yellow and a yellow time of 4.4 
seconds. Site 6 the only site without AWFs, has the furthest probability of stopping and largest 
dilemma zone. Information provided to the drivers at the Site 2 causes a drastic shift in the 
probability of stopping. Under the authority of the City of Lincoln, the Site 2 site is operated 
differently than the NDOR sites.  
The main distinctions of the Site 2 site from the NDOR sites are: the AWFs are 87 ft. closer to 
the stop bar than at the 3 NDOR sites and the sum of the yellow time and time before yellow the 
advance warning flashers come on is 0.7 seconds larger than at Site 3 and 2.2 seconds longer than 
at Site 1 and Site 4.  
It appears, as illustrated in Figure 4 that the longer drivers are presented with information 
(yellow time and time before yellow AWFs come on) their probability of stopping earlier 
increases. Site 2 and Site 3 present information to drivers the longest, while Site 6 does not 
present drivers with information prior to the onset of yellow. 
Figure 4a illustrates the dilemma zone hazard curve at Site 4. The severe deceleration and 
maximum passing distance are the critical thresholds for the severe conflicts. The risk of conflict 
increases until reaching the maximum passing distance. Figure 4a also illustrates a large 
percentage of drivers predicted to make erroneous decisions at the onset of yellow based on the 
severe deceleration and maximum passing thresholds. In particular, a sizeable percentage of 
drivers are predicted to either accelerate heavily or run the red light; thus, potentially causing a 
right angle collision. 
No AIC Value No AIC Value No  AIC Value 
Site 1 0.433 Site 3 0.449 Site 5 0.521 
Site 2 0.513 Site 4 0.428 Site 6 0.283 
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Fig. 4 - Probability of perceived traffic conflict at different sites 
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Fig. 5 - Calculated weighted risk Fig. 6 - Proportion of vehicles performing severe deceleration or RLR 
 
As shown below in Figure 4b, the drastic shift in probability of stopping at Site 2 causes 
virtually every driver approaching the intersection to potentially have a severe conflict. Based on 
the yellow time of 5.6 seconds and posted speed limit (55 mph), a driver traveling at the speed 
limit could pass through the intersection from a distance of 485 feet at the onset of yellow. While 
the length in yellow is significantly decreasing the possibility of a red light runner the information 
provided to the driver from the AWFs is telling them otherwise, resulting in significantly large 
predicted perceived severe conflicts, such as, abrupt stop, heavy deceleration, or vehicle skidding. 
The risk associated with these conflicts may lead to a severe rear-end crash. Evidence that longer 
yellows decrease the percentage of RLRs is also found in [22] while similar to Koll et al. [30], 
providing drivers with information leading to early stops can increase the possibility of severe 
rear-end collisions. As shown in Figure 4c, if information is provided correctly, it can decrease 
the risk to drivers approaching the intersection. The predicted severe risk of crash at Site 3 site is 
significantly lower than the other studied sites. 
Weighted risk was calculated by first integrating the area under both severe conflict 
thresholds. An average of the integration is computed. Lastly, the proportion of vehicles within 
each speed category is multiplied by the averaged integration resulting in a weighted average of 
risk for a driver approaching an intersection. The weighted average risk was found for both 
critical thresholds. Results of the risk analysis are shown in Figure 5. The effect of information is 
seen in that the sites seem to mitigate the probability of conflict for one of the two thresholds. As 
expected, Site 2 and Site 5 have the largest rear-end risk, while Site 1 and Site 4 have the largest 
risk of running the red light. 
  
Advances in Transportation Studies an international Journal  RSS2011 Special Issue
- 38 -
Actual severe conflicts were totaled and proportioned for each site vehicles requiring a 
deceleration rate of 14.41 ft/s2 or higher and the observed RLRs.  Similar to the weighted risks, a 
trade off was found between the proportion of vehicles requiring severe deceleration and running 
the red light, shown in Figure 6. The proportions of risks and conflicts at Sites 1, 2, 4, and 5 were 
almost in complete agreement between the calculated risks and accident histories. The calculated 
risk and proportion of severe conflicts have a good correlation; however, at Site 3 the proportions 
have switched. 
 
5. Discussion 
Figures 4a and 4b display the large percentage of drivers at risk of a severe conflict. Having 
such large percentages of drivers at risk to severe conflicts is problematic. Figure 7  illustrates the 
hypothetical probability of stopping under four different conditions. Curves A and D represent 
intersections where the majority of drivers are performing erroneous decisions. Similar to the 
results from Site 2, drivers approaching the intersection represented by Curve A have virtually 
every driver at risk to a severe stopping conflict. Curve D has a significantly large percentage 
predicted to heavily accelerate or run the red light. The stopping curve represented by Curve C is 
noticeably better in providing drivers with protection from severe conflicts, as the majority of 
drivers are stopping between the severe deceleration and maximum passing distances. Ideally, the 
probability of stopping curve would appear as shown by Curve B, where the decision dilemma 
zone boundaries are within the thresholds of severe deceleration and maximum passing distance, 
thus minimizing the risk of severe conflicts at the onset of yellow. 
Finally, in comparison with previous literature [30, 34-36] the calculated perceived yellow 
time length versus actual length was plotted, as shown in Figure 8. Intersections with AWFs or in 
the case of Koll et al. [30, 34-36] flashing green were plotted separately from intersections not 
providing drivers information. Four intersections were graphed from [36]; however, the perceived 
time and actual yellow lengths for all four intersections were four seconds. Based on this sample 
of intersections, drivers approaching intersections without being provided information correctly 
perceived the time threshold, while drivers inaccurately predicted the time threshold at 
intersections providing them information. The largest outliers from Figure 8 are points A, B, and 
C, which represent Site 2, Site 5, and Koll’s studied sites in Austria. In addition, Figure 8 displays 
what type of risk is associated with being above or below the line. 
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The three previously mentioned sites have the potential for increases rear-end risk, as these 
intersections all fall below the line. Conversely, any intersection above the line would have the 
potential for increased RLR risk. Therefore, while providing drivers with information has shown 
to reduce accidents and in particular RLRs, this study suggests providing information to drivers 
can increase their risks. In particular, the risk of stopping conflicts increases with information. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The effect of information was shown on both probability of stopping curves and the resulting 
probability of perceived conflicts. Results from Sites 2 and 5 found a shift in the probability of 
stopping closer to the intersection resulting in an increase in rear-end risk, while a large 
probability of RLR at Site 4. Site 3 site had the shortest dilemma zone, lowest predicted severe 
conflict risk, as well as the curve most consist with an ideal probability of stopping curve. The 
reason the Site 3 site performs significantly better than the other sites was not determined by the 
authors in this current study. The site is operated similarly to the other studied sites, yet performs 
better. These results contributed to increases in both rear-end and RLR risk by providing 
information to drivers. The effect of information on rear-ends and RLR risk was shown to have an 
inverse relationship. As the rear-end risk increased, the RLR risk decreased as vice versa. A 
reasonable correlation was found between the rear-end and RLR risk and the accident histories at 
each site similar to previous findings on the correlation between conflicts and crashes. It is 
evident that providing drivers with information in advance of the intersection using AWFs can 
potentially cause increased risk in both RLRs and stopping as opposed to decreasing the risk of 
drivers approaching the intersection. Thus, caution should be used by engineers before providing 
drivers with information at a high speed intersection. 
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